Introduction
One of the central concerns of a theory of pra~atics
is to explain what actions language users perform by making utterances. This concern is also relevant to the designers of conversational language understanding systems, especially those intended to cooperate with a user in the execution of some task (e.g., the Computer Consultant task discussed in Walker [1978] ).
All actions have effects on the world, and may have preconditions which must obtain for them to be successfully executed.
For actions whose execution causes the generation of linguistic utterances (or s~eeqh acts), the preconditions may include the speaker/wrlter holding certain beliefs about the world, and having certain intentions as to how it should change ( [Austin, 1962] , [Searle, 1969] ).
In Cohen [1978] and Cohen and Perrault [1979] it is suggested that speech acts a• be defined in the context of a plannln~ s~stam (e.g., STRIPS of Fikes and Nllsson [1971] ) i.e., as a class of parameterlzed procedures called operators, whose execution can modify the world. Each operator is labelled with formulas stating its preconditions and effects.
The major problem of a theory of speech acts is relating the form of utterances to the acts which are performed by uttering them. Several syntactic devices can be used to indicate the speech act being performed: the most obvious are explicit performative verbs, mood, and intonation.
But no combination of these provides a clear, single-valued function from form to illocutionary force.
For example, (1.a)-(1.e) and even (1.f) can be requests to pass the salt.
1.a)
I want you to pass the salt. 1.b) Do you have the salt? 1.c) Is the salt near you? 1.d) I want the salt.
1.e)
Can you pass the salt? 1.f) John asked me to ask you to pass the salt.
Furthermore, all these utterances can also be intended literally in some contexts. For example, a parent leaving a child at the train station may ask "Do you know when the train leaves?" expecting a yes/no answer as a confirmation.
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ee Unless otherwise indicated, we take "speech act" to be synon~nnous with "illocutionary act."
The object of this paper is to discuss, at an intuitive level, an extension to the work in Cohen [1978] An essential part of helpful behavior is the adoption by one agent of a goal of another, followed by an attempt to achieve it. For example, for a store clerk to reply "How many do you want?" to a customer who has asked "Where are the steaks? e, the clerk must have inferred that the customer wants steaks, and then he must have decided to get them himself. This might have occurred even if the clerk knew that the custamer had intended to get the steaks himself.
Cooperative behavior must be accounted for independently of speech acts, for it often occurs without the use of language.
(2.c)
In order for a speaker to successfully perform a speech act, he must intend that the hearer recognize his intention to achieve certain (perlocutionary) effects, and must believe it is likely that the hearer will be able to do so. This is the foundation the account of illooutionary acts proposed by Strawson [196q] and Searle [1969] , based on Grice [1957] .
Language users know that others are capable of achieving goals, of recognizing actions, and of cooperative behavior.
Furthermore, they know that others know they know, etc.
Thus, a speaker may intend not only that his actions be recognized but also that his goals be in/erred, and that the hearer be cooperative.
(2.e) Thus a speaker can perform one speech act A by performing another speech act B if he intends that the hearer recognize not only that B was performed but also that through cooperative behavior by the hearer, intended by the speaker, the effects of A should be achieved.
Th__~e Speech Act Model
In the spirit of Searle [1975] ; Gordon and Lakoff [1975] "If agent S believes that agent A wants to do action ACT then it is plausible that 3 believes that A wants to achieve the effects of ACT."
"Zf S believes A wants to know whether a proposition P is true. then it is plausible that S believes that A wants to achieve P."
Of course, given the conditions in the second inference above. S might also infer that A ham a goal of achieving not P. This is another possible inference. Which applies in a given setting is detemlned by the rating heuristics (see 3.d below).
Simple rules can be augmented by adding the condition that the recognizer believes that the other agent intended him to perfom the inference.
An example of an augmented recognition rule is: "If S believes that A wants S to re.=ognize A's intention to do ACT. then it is plausible that S believes that A wants S to recognize A's intention to achieve the effects of ACT."
Notice that the augmented rule is obtained by intrc~uclng "S believes A wants" In the antecedent and consequent of the simple rule. and by interpreting "S recognizes A's intention" as "S comes to believe that A wants." Theme rules can be constructed from the simple ones by assuming that language users share a model of the construction and recognition processes. A set of heuristics to guide plan recognition by rating the plausibility of the outcomes. One of the heuristics iS: "Decrease the plausibility of an outcome in which an agent Is believed to be executing an action whose effects he already believes to be true." Soripl~-derived expectations also provide s~e of the control of the recognition process.
(3.e)
A set of heuristics to identify the obstacles in the recognized plan. These are the goals that the speaker cannot easily achieve without assistance.
If we assume that the hearer is cooperating with the speaker, the hearer will usually attempt to help achieve these goals in his response.
With these constituents, we have a model of helpful behavior:
an agent S hears an utterance from some other agent A. and then Identifies the surface speech act. From this. S applies the inference rules to reconstruct A's plan that produced the utterance. S can then examine this plan for obstanles and give s helpful response based on them. However, some of the inference rules may have been augmented by the recognition of intention condition.
Thus. some obstacles may have been intended to be communicated by the speaker. These specify whet tllooutionary act the speaker performed. With interpretation (a), S can simply answer the question, whereas with interpretation (b), S is obliged to glve a reason for not answering with the departure time.
The distinction between these two cases is simply that in the latter, S believes that A intended S to make the inferences above and deduce the goal (q,f).
Thus the inferences applied above were actually augmented inferences as described previously.
In the former interpretation, S does not believe A intended S to make the inferences, but did anyway in order to be helpful.
Concludln~ Remarks
This speech act model was implemented as part of a program which plays the role of a clerk at a train station information booth [Allen, 1979] . The main results are the following: This includes idiomatic forms such as (1.a) and non-idlomatlc ones such as (1.f). It does so using only a few independently necessary mechanisms.
It maintains a distinction between tllocuttonary and perlocutionary acts.
In particular, it accounts for how a given response by one participant B to an utterance by A may be the result of different chains of inferences made by B:
either B believed the response given was intended by A, or 8 believed that the response was helpful (i.e., non-intended).
It also shows some ways in which the conversational context can favor some interpretations over others. There remain several open problems In a theory of speech acts which we believe to be largely independent of the issue of indirection, notably identifying the features of a text which determine literal tllocutlonary force, as well as constructing representations adequate to express the relation between several lllocutionary force indicators which may be present in one sentence (see [Lakoff, 197q] and [Morgan, 1973] 
